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2INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
For-hire services are emerging
• Reduction of transaction times
• Reduction of costs to both suppliers and customers
⇒ More than one service in the same territory, from several cities
⇒ A stream of research to optimize the matching between cabs
and riders.
DESIGN ISSUES
• How does the competition between two for-hire operators
influence the demand, and also each supplier?
• What are the conditions for profit maximization with respect to 
tariff and fleet size, under the influence of the competing 
service?
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3OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
OBJECTIVE
To propose a microeconomic analysis of the duopoly
competition between two for-hire services available in a given
territory.
METHODOLOGY
- Based on Leurent (2017) Orbicity model of one cab service in a 
ring-shaped city => Emphasis on the Availability function
- Here, we adapt the availability function in order to incorporate 
the competition between services.
- A theoretical framework to depict the influences of supplier 
behaviors in the duopoly setting.
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4PRESENTATION PLAN
I. Demand-supply model for a for-hire service
1. Modeling assumptions
2. Supply functions
3. Demand function
4. Traffic and economic equilibrium
II. Duopoly market
1. Update of modeling assumptions
2. Market share formulation
3. Traffic equilibrium
4. Economic equilibrium
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5SUPPLY- DEMAND MODEL 
Monopoly setting
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6MODELING ASSUMPTIONS: MOBILITY SERVICE
- Private taxis as vehicles
- Vehicle capacity = 1 seat
- Operational conditions
- Fleet size 
- Service speed  and travel time 
- Tariff fare 
- Access time 
- Production process
- Each customer is assigned to the nearest available vehicle
- No detour
- Empty vehicles go on running  
- Mobility demand
- Trip generation uniformly distributed along the ring and over 
time
- Demand volume Q during a time period H.
- Average trip length is related to ring area .
- Individual values of time (access time and ride).
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7SUPPLY FUNCTION
The access time of a taxi service depends on the number of
available vehicles, the number of requests, and the
occupation time of taxis (ride time).
 	 
,  , , 
The production costs on a daily basis amounts to:
 ,  	     
Wherein:
-  is the total production cost
-  includes the costs of vehicle depreciation, driver wages and
the cost of the transaction platform.
-  is the running cost per cab and per unit of time.
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8THE DEMAND MODEL
The demand function depends on the quality of service
(access time and travel time) and on the fare . 
 	 , , 	
The generalized cost is considered as
 	     
We assume that   	  
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where $ is the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
generalized cost
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10DEFINITION OF THE AVAILABILITY FUNCTION
The availability function is established as function with respect to
vacant cabs under the form:
 	
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wherein % is the number of vacant taxis and  a coefficient
depending on the area form.
(Douglas, 1972; De Vany, 1975; Cairns and Liston-Heyes, 1996; Yang et al., 2002,
2005, Leurent, 2017)
This imposes a condition on the fleet size:
 * /'  	 2
'
 
J. Berrada, F. Leurent @ ITEA 2019
11TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
We considered from previous definitions of demand function and 
supply function that:
These conditions constitute a system of non-linear equations that
can be solved using a fixed point algorithm.
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Effects of attributes on the demand
combined function (e.g. tariff fare)
Equilibrium demand volume w.r.t. tariff
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12MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Supplier Behavior
The profit is expressed as 1 , , ,  ,  	  (  ,  , ,  .
The maximization problem is then
Profit maximization problem
max
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DUOPOLY
Duopoly setting
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14ADDITIONAL MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
- Two for-hire companies
- Services indexed by : ∈ <=, >?
- Same operating periods @
- Operational conditions
- Fleet sizes = and >
- Tariff fares = and >
- Temporality of the service quality
- At instant h, each service has a particular availability time. 
- Availability times = and >	are assumed as independent Random
Variables (RV)
- They have parameters A: and means B:
- Mobility demand
- Each user is a rational decision-maker and selects the service :
with minimal generalized cost C: D CE	
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15MARKET SHARE DESCRIPTION
The market share of service F aggregates the outcomes of all 
individual situations : 
Consider GH 	 H   and GI 	 GJ ( GK
LH 	 Pr service	F	is	selected 	 Pr	<H D W?
GK X GJ
K X GI/ K Y GI/
K X J		∀J * 0
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16ILLUSTRATION
Market share of service 1 w.r.t. its tariff for several availability times of it
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17IMPACT ON AVAILABILITY TIMES 
Availability times are in turn affected by the choice of users. 
If service 1 selected: 
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18TRAFFIC EQUILIBRIUM
Fixed demand Variable demand
Availability time of service 2 w.r.t. service 
demand volume for several values of theta1
Traffic equilibrium with variable demand 
w.r.t. demand volumes
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19MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Cost function
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Supplier Behavior
The new profit maximization problem is written as
Profit maximization problem
max
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20CONCLUSIONS
• The availability is a major factor of service quality and 
then of demand choice from among competing services. 
• The joint availability of alternatives services yields
benefits to users. 
• The influences of the competition on the production 
processes are traced out in the issues of traffic and 
economic equilibrium. 
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